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Abstract:  In this paper I introduce some of the key elements of Daniel Dennett’s theory 
of intentional attribution and their relation with his notion of rationality. While doing so 
I will show that Dennett’s approach implies a circularity in the process of attribution of 
rationality, and that his resource to evolutionary arguments for trying to avoid an infinite 
regress does not help him to avoid the problem. My presentation will include a revision of 
Dennett’s arguments for epistemic intentional ascription and rationality attribution as well 
as some criticisms developed against his proposal. At the end of the article I will extend the 
criticisms and present my view about his proposal for ideal rationality attribution.
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atribución intencional de Daniel Dennett y sus relaciones con la noción de racionalidad. 
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INTENTIONAL ATTRIBUTION AND RATIONALITY: A 
CRITICAL READING OF DENNETT’S INTENTIONAL 
ATTRIBUTION PROGRAM1
1. Presentation
The main problems a theory of mind should address, one can say paraphrasing 
Dennett, are the what and the how of Consciousness and Content (1978, pp. 351-
366). Only by answering those questions would a theory of the mind possibly aspire 
to be considered successful. Dennett’s proposal for such a theory that responds 
properly to the questions of what contents can be rightly assigned to an entity and 
how such contents are arranged and interconnected is developed in his Intentional 
Attribution program. Whatever minds could be, and whatever our mental states 
are, Dennett would say, the only way we can be aware of them is by the study 
of the way such things play their roles in the interactions between subjects and 
their environments, i.e. their behavior. Dennett’s Intentional Attribution program 
is a behavioral predictive strategy that allows us to anticipate the actions of the 
subjects based on the information we have about the structure that underlies 
their behavior. Dennett’s thesis is that intentional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, 
pains, and so are “perfectly objective phenomena”, whose existence can only be 
discerned from the point of view of a researcher that adopts certain predictive 
strategy, the intentional attribution strategy (1979, pp.13-36). 
Dennett's three-stance model
In order to show how the prediction of behaviors is not only possible but 
also effective, Dennett introduces his so-called three-stance model, that operates 
this way: in the most basic level of reality, things (creatures, entities) are simply 
material aggregates that differ from one another only in their degree of complexity. 
1 This paper is a result of the research project Epistemic and non-epistemic beliefs, led by 
the author.
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When dealing with entities at this level, it is enough to understand the physical 
laws that rule the interaction among its parts to be able to predict the entity’s 
behavior. In such a case one’s perspective is what Dennett named the Physical 
Stance, a perspective that allows us to predict entity’s behavior limited only by 
our knowledge of the building blocks and basic laws of the material world. The 
Physical Stance is a perspective applicable to any entity; but only in the case of 
the very simple ones will its use lead us to reliable results. It is perfectly possible 
to anticipate the trajectory, physical behavior, of a rock or an arrow by using only 
the Newtonian laws of motion, and the results are going to be as accurate as 
our knowledge of the laws permits. But not all entities are as simple as rocks 
and arrows. In the case of ballistic missiles for example, their behavior can be 
anticipated not only by assuming they are physical compounds, but also by the 
assignation of some structural design.  In this case, the prediction of behavior 
would rest on the reliability of the design and the optimal physical structure of the 
entity. For this reason, Dennett called this stage the Design Stance. In this level, 
prediction relies on the combination of the physical and design features, and in 
the idea that the entity would act in a way that would not prevent it from fulfilling 
the task it was designed for.
But the complexity of the world does not stop at the design level; some complex 
machines and every living creature (or at least most of them) are much more 
complex in their behaviors than pre-established trajectory followers. Dennett's 
proposal is that, in order to make sense of the behavior of such complex systems, 
it will be useful to treat them as if they were rational agents whose decisions are 
based on beliefs and desires, in other words, as intentional agents. When trying 
to predict the behavior of such systems, one has to assume them operating as 
optimally designed devices, device that would do their best to achieve any goal 
they are pursuing. By using this strategy, one is approaching behavior’s prediction 
from the Intentional Stance.
Intentional attribution is a bi-directional strategy that operates either from 
simplicity to complexity or from complexity to simplicity. On the ascendant 
side one starts at the physical stance in order to predict entity’s behavior, if one 
generates a successful predictive model based on the mere physical structure of 
the subject, then one stops right there. But if there are some conducts of the 
entity that are not possible to be anticipated from this perspective, then it would 
be necessary move into the design stance and to treat the subject as a physically 
optimal structure whose design allows it to behave in a particular way. Again, 
if this is enough for obtaining a reliable prediction no more steps are needed, 
otherwise, one final move is required. One starts treating the entity as a rational 
agent whose responses are the result of presenting and contrasting alternative 
courses of action and choosing the most effective among them. Even the highly 
complicated behavior of humans can be predicted reliably by using this strategy.
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On the other side of the system, when facing complex subject’s behavior one 
starts by ascribing entities with intentional attitudes and use them as predictive 
tools: “one stars with the ideal perfect rationality and revises downward as 
circumstances dictate” (Dennett's, 1979, pp. 21) What is particular in this case 
is that one is required to descend to the design stance only if the attribution of 
rationality is not guaranteed. If one is going to attribute intentions to a table or 
a chair, one is going to end ascribing it things like its desire to serve as support, 
or its believing to be the center of the world. This would offer no help when 
trying to anticipate if it would hold a very heavy refrigerator during a Saturday 
morning cleaning session. The same logic rules the passage from the design stance 
to the physical stance, asking for the “design” features of an electron is going 
to tell us nothing about, say, its electric charge. In cases like those, intentional 
ascription would introduce more problems than solutions, making complexity out 
of simplicity.
It has to be noticed that Dennett’s intentional attribution system depends 
on the assignation of rationality to the subject. The subject has to believe all 
the consequences of its actions in order for its behavior to be predictable. This 
commitment is so strong that if the predictive system fails, the causes of the failure 
have not to be tracked down to some irrationality in the entity’s behavior, but to 
the predictive system itself. 
The presumption of rationality is so strongly entrenched in our inference habits 
that when predictions prove false, we at first cast about for adjustments in the 
information possession conditions or goal weightings, before questioning the 
rationality of the system as a whole (Dennett 1978, p.9).
Making explicit Dennett’s notion of rationality and its implications to the 
intentional attribution program are tasks I am going to deal with latter in this text.
2. Intentional attribution and rationality
Despite the presumption of rationality, beliefs themselves, along with the 
other intentional attitudes, are attributed to entities just as a pragmatic tool, not as 
any sort of metaphysical notion. Such assumptions of rationality are nothing more 
than “heuristic idealizations, justifiable only insofar as they lead, by and large, to 
true intentional stance predictions” (Fodor, 1981, p. 105).  Dennett has defended 
this project in all his papers about intentional attribution. As an example, let’s see 
it as part of a discussion about one of Dennett’s favorite cases:
Lingering doubts about whether the chess-playing computers really have 
beliefs and desires are misplaced; for the definition of intentional systems 
I have given does not say that intentional systems really have beliefs and 
desires, but that one can explain and predict their behavior by ascribing 
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beliefs and desires to them, and whether one calls what one ascribes to 
the computer beliefs or belief-analogues or information complexes or 
intentional whatnots makes no difference to the nature of the calculation 
one makes on the basis of the ascriptions (1971, p. 7).
The attribution of intentional attitudes to an entity depends on the idea that 
what count as beliefs, desires, and the so, are “all the truths relevant to the system’s 
interests (or desires) that the system’s experience to date has made available” 
(Dennett, 1979, p.19). This makes true believers, the only entities whose behavior 
is predictable from the intentional stance, believers of truths.2
Being strongly committed with the mentioned rationality requirement for the 
subject, Dennett’s is interested in showing a reliable source for rationality, one 
that sets the intentional attribution program in solid ground. Natural Selection 
offers a promising answer, and Dennett is eager to use it. According to Dennett’s 
view on natural selection, living creatures are organized in a continuous chain that 
goes from simplicity to complexity. Such a chain, an “evolutionary chain” in the 
Darwinian sense of the word, starts with the basic organisms whose response to 
the environment is determined by natural selection. These so-called Darwinian 
Creatures (1996, p. 83) develop responses in a blind way, just as the result of 
an endless procedure that generates ‘mutations’ in the offspring of the current 
generation. In the long run, mutations will allow the survival of the species by 
making apt individuals, those with the “right” features”, to survive and be able to 
reproduce. The next step in the chain is the one of the creatures whose responses 
are not blind or forced by the laws of natural evolution, but advanced out of a 
stimulus-response relation with the environment. Skinnerian Creatures learn what 
2 I would like to make a brief comment about the parallel between Dennett’s ascription 
of truth to the beliefs and Davidson’s principle of charity for radical interpretation. Trying 
to solve the question about the ability language interpreters exhibit when making sense 
of someone else’s utterances, Davidson proposes to “take the fact that the speakers of a 
language hold a sentence to be true (under observed circumstances) as prima-facie evidence 
that the sentence is true under those circumstances” (Davidson, 1974). This principle of 
charity, or Charitable Principle, is the very central axiom of Davidson’s system and encloses 
important elements of the interpretation attempt. It makes the truth of an utterance relative 
to “observed circumstances”. Those circumstances are in turn dependent on the moment 
and context of the performance of the utterance. Therefore, the truth or falsity value of 
a sentence is something to be judged only by somebody who knows the actual situation 
under which the utterance was done. But because the interpretation is a two-way process, 
it also implies that the speaker must know that the conditions under which his utterances 
are made are such that the listener has a good chance to make sense of them. In other 
words, the principle of charity defines the conditions under which the linguistic behavior 
of the agents is necessarily rational. In Dennett’s case, those conditions are also going to be 
the ones that would allow interpreters to make sense of the behavior of concrete entities’ 
behavior, under appropriate circumstances, i.e., under the basic assumption of subject’s 
rationality.
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kinds of responses are the adequate ones to the exigencies of the environment 
they happen to be immersed in, and act according to such exigencies. These 
entities are capable of developing behaviors based on the specific information 
provided by the particular environment they live in, but are still unable to make 
any kind of prediction about the future course of actions in the surrounding world. 
Such an interesting feature is what characterizes beings belonging to the chain’s 
third step, where the anticipation of future events is what generates alternative sets 
of actions. Those alternative sets are developed by contrasting possible courses of 
action in mental environments of representations of the world, in which favored 
behaviors are contrasted against mental representation instead of against the world 
itself, in a process that allows the more imaginative individuals to get a better 
chance to succeed. Such a capacity for imagining and comparing is no doubt a 
remarkable one, but if one thinks this is an amazing system for the generation of 
behaviors, there is still another much more impressive system: “meta-learning.” 
At the top of the “evolutionary chain” there are creatures capable not just of 
reacting to the forces coming from the environment, or of learning how and 
when to generate specific kinds of responses but that are even able to learn about 
their own ability for learning and improve it. These creatures have developed the 
competence for manipulating the incoming information for the creation of “smart 
moves,” behaviors designed to maximize the probability of success. Of course we 
human beings occupied this place. Is in this sense that Dennett sees us as optimal 
creatures, creatures whose abilities integrate and exceed those of the inhabitants 
of the other levels, and whose responses are based on well studied and elaborated 
analysis of the environment and of the subject’s performances capabilities.
However the features of the creatures in the top of the layer may appear 
particular to humans, for Dennett it is clear that we are not the only ones inhabiting 
the place. There is a lot of evidence that beings other than humans have the 
ability to develop strategies for “smart moves” out of the information they receive 
from the environment. As mentioned before, Dennett’s favorite examples are 
chess-playing computers; such devices have as part of their programs the skills for 
choosing from a set of possible moves those that are better responses to the actual 
situation of the game than others from the set of possible ones. Such a capability, 
either present since the primal programming of the machine or developed out of 
the (also designed) faculty of learning from past moves or games, matches perfectly 
the criteria presented for being considered an optimal creature, making the “chain 
of living creatures” extend to the non-living ones. 
The move toward natural selection has paid then the expected dividends and 
more. It has made intentional attribution program, as a tool for making sense 
of creature’s behavior, continuous with natural evolution theory as an epistemic 
approach to the behavior (organization and speciation) of living organisms. It has 
also permitted the connection between living and non-living creatures as subjects 
whose behavior can be understood and anticipated from the intentional stance.
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Despite the results Dennett’s intentional attribution system could provide us 
with, there are some elements of the intentional attribution program that would 
require further analysis. Among them, there is the relation between researcher’s 
intentional states and subject’s intentional states, a relation that seems more 
complicated than what Dennett seems to admit. Dennett requires agents to be 
perfectly rational in order its behavior to be predictable. But what counts as a 
guarantee for the attribution of rationality? The rest of this paper will be devoted 
to the task of sharpening this question and the searching for some answers. To 
do so, I will present first my arguments against Dennett’s view of the relation 
between rationality and natural selection. Then I will challenge the notion of ideal 
rationality of the agents that underlies the Dennett’s general program. It has to 
be noticed right now that by no way such criticisms are brand new; a lot has 
been written about those elements of the intentional attribution program. For 
such a reason my approach will follow prior critical views, both because there 
are some shared elements between them and my personal view and because of 
the lightening perspective they offer. However, at least I expect, my own criticism 
would take distance from the prior ones, showing new problems and presenting 
new challenges to Dennett’s program.
3. Natural selection and intentionality
Let’s start with Dennett’s approach to natural selection. Dennett’s theory of 
mental content can be described as a functional approach, one in which
 
All attributions of content are founded on an appreciation of the functional 
roles of the items in question in the biological economy of the organism (or 
the engineering economy of the robot). This is a specifically “teleological” 
notion of function (not the notion of a mathematical function or of a mere 
“causal role” as suggested by David Lewis and others). It is the concept of 
function that is ubiquitous in engineering, in the design of artifacts, but also 
in biology (1998, pp.359-360).
From such a functionalist perspective, Dennett’s general program deals with 
subject’s reasons via idealization of instrumental rationality. But in his approach 
to natural selection and the way subjects become rational, Dennett uses the 
passage from simplicity to complexity as a teleological guide. And such a notion of 
teleological rationality permeates Dennett’s entire program, compromising it. In 
other words, Dennett needs natural selection to warrant the necessity of perfect 
rationality. This is what Stephen Stich has named Dennett’s argument from natural 
selection.3 “But why,” asks Stich, “would the mere existence of natural selection 
suffice to ensure that the creatures would be good approximations to the thoroughly 
rational ideal embodied in the notion of intentional system? (1984, p.256) It is 
just not true that natural selection operates favoring inferential strategies that yield 
3  (Stich, 1984).
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mostly true beliefs, and Dennett seems to forget it. What natural selection favors 
is the appearance of beliefs that, in the long run, would generate some selective 
advantage.
Natural selection may often favor a process that yields false beliefs all the 
time, but which has a high probability of yielding true beliefs when it counts. 
[…] If eating a certain food causes illness on a single occasion, the organism 
would immediately come to believe (falsely, let us assume) that all passingly 
similar foods are poisonous as well. When it comes to food poisoning, better 
safe than sorry is a policy that recommends itself to natural selection (1984, 
p. 126). 
What Stich is pointing out is the fact that is it not necessary that evolution 
produces only successes. A mutation, a blind change, is not per se a mistake or 
a hit; it is only a change. In such a sense, single mutation could be as right as 
it could be mistaken, but that is something to be evaluated a posteriori, after 
a large number of replications of the new features. And this will happen far in 
the future of the original change. This is precisely what happens all the time, 
only some changes increase organisms’ opportunities for survival, but even the 
most extravagant mutation could generate evolutionary gain. If there are some 
dramatic changes in the environment it is possible only the organisms which such 
a dramatically new feature would survive, making an odd change the best of the 
options. In this respect, Dennett operates with a very rigid notion of change, and 
nature has shown to be more dynamic than that. 
Dennett answers, claiming for the necessity of the evolutionary argument for 
any interpreter engaged in the intentional attribution program:
 
We have already seen that there is no point in ascribing beliefs to a system 
unless the beliefs ascribed are in general appropriate to the environment, and 
the system responds appropriately to the beliefs. An eccentric expression of 
this would be: the capacity to believe would have no survival value unless it 
were a capacity to believe truths. What is eccentric and potentially misleading 
about this is that it hints at the picture of a species “trying on” a faculty giving 
rise to beliefs most of which are false, having its inutility demonstrated, and 
abandoning it. A species might “experiment” by mutation any number of 
inefficacious systems, but none of these systems would deserve to be called 
belief systems precisely because of their defects, their non-rationality, and 
hence a false belief system is a conceptual impossibility (1978, p.17). 
The answer is then that we have to stand on the solid ground of our own 
interpretation system in order to make sense of the role played by evolution 
in the process of selecting true believers. But even if this point is conceded in 
favor to Dennett, the question about Natural Selection’s role as the designer of 
living organisms would still be open. Beyond the role of our own interpretative 
system nothing has been said yet about the way natural selection accounts for the 
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presence of rationality as a common feature to some of the organisms in the final 
steps of the evolutionary chain.
In an attempt to clarify his position about this issue, Dennett draws an analogy 
between his account of Natural Selection as a designer and R. Dawkins’s model 
of human organisms as survival engines for genes4. Let us imagine, Dennett says, 
a device designed to hold a receptacle containing the body of a person who 
wants to hold his life in suspension for four centuries and to be “waked up” at the 
end of that time lapse. Such a device would have to be designed to provide the 
necessary energy and protection to the receptacle in order to fulfill its final task, 
i.e., the preservation of the live that lies beneath its mechanical armor. Among the 
multiple designs one can ask for, the most effective one would be that capable of 
recognizing the environment and respond to that knowledge acting according to 
its main purpose. Mobility in order to avoid threatening intruders and to pursue 
energy supply would be one of the expected features for the engine to posses will it 
increase the survival chances of its precious load. A big robot in whose interior the 
receptacle has been placed safety would be a vivid image of the desired system. 
But not any robot would be able to accomplish the task. As one of the multiple 
individuals in a highly populated environment, the robot must be prepared to 
compete with other individuals for the basic supplies required to warrant its proper 
functioning, as an indispensable requirement to complete its task.  
It would no doubt be wise to design it [the robot] with enough sophistication 
in its control system to permit it to calculate the benefits and risks of 
cooperating with other robots, or forming alliances for mutual benefits. The 
result of this design project would be a robot capable of exhibiting self-
control … capable of deriving its own subsidiary goals from its assessment of 
its current state and the import of that state for its ultimate goal (which is to 
preserve you) (Dennett, 1987, p. 297). 
The kind of robot just described would be the perfect engine for the assigned 
job. But if it seems that such an engine is just the artificial intelligence engineers’ 
dream, Dennett reminds us that this is just a variation on the theme of biological 
species as hosts, survival engines, of some astute and selfish entities, genes. 
Dennett’s account of Dawkins model states that living creatures, with human 
beings among them, have been designed as survival engines for genes. The very 
limited capability of such entities for interacting with the environment would 
make its subsistence simply impossible, unless they would count with the unmeant 
cooperation of the creatures that host them, us, and whose interests we pursue 
while pursuing ours. 
However appealing this analogy would seem, Dennett acknowledges quickly, 
it is nevertheless incomplete:
4 Dawkins (1976) and Dawkins (1986)
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In my tale I supposed that there was conscious, deliberated, foresighted 
engineering involved in the creation of the robot, whereas even if we are, 
as Dawkins says, the product of design process that has our genes as the 
primary beneficiary, that is a design process that utterly lacks a conscious, 
deliberate, foresighted engineering (1987, p. 299).
The discrepancy between the two cases is obvious, it rests in the question of 
who is responsible for the design of biological engines. Dennett’s own answer to 
this question is that Mother Nature, “the long slow process of evolution by Natural 
Selection” has played such an outstanding role. The main bulk of Dennett’s article 
is devoted to the justification of his proposal of natural selection as designer of 
living creatures, but I am not dealing with such a justification in this paper. My 
purpose is just to show that there is a second limit in the analogy that Dennett 
seems to have left untouched. 
The difficulty I want to point out arises from the tension between Natural 
Selection’s blindness, a fact Dennett stresses widely in his philosophical work, 
and the necessity for a teleologically oriented design as part of the model just 
presented. In his example of the robot and the receptacle the main task of the 
machine is defined since the moment of its conception, namely, to preserve the 
life of the individual inhabiting the receptacle. All the secondary goals the robot is 
able to define in order to guarantee energy supply and security are just subsidiary 
to its main goal, something clearly defined since the creation of the robot. Without 
the basic aim of preserving the live inside the capsule, something decided by the 
designer, the robot’s secondary goals are superfluous, as it is the engine itself. It 
would make no more sense for our robot trying to search for energy sources than 
for a ballistic missile to fly without a defined target. And here is where the tension 
arises, because for the analogy to be held whatever the designer ends up being, 
it would have to be working under the idea of designing toward a specific end. 
Without a clear end there would not be any mandatory task to complete, and then 
no reason for the engine to exist. Of course this is not the case for Natural Selection. 
Acting over changes produced randomly and not by any prior motivation, Natural 
Selection does not pursue any specific goal but “chooses” (to use one of Dennett’s 
analogies) among the changes those that increase species’ chances to reproduce 
effectively and survive. In other words, Natural Selection with “original reasons” 
would no longer be blind. And blindness is for Natural Selection its most precious 
quality. Then, the analogy does not seem to run as expected and the conclusions 
Dennett obtains from its use would have to be re-evaluated, or the system that rest 
on Natural Selection as an explanatory tool would be jeopardize.
However, in order to be fair to Dennett one has to admit that in every new 
generation of a species, the goal of Natural Selection is to ensure that the creatures 
best suited to the environment are precisely those whose chances to reproduce 
successfully are bigger. Such a goal, one would be tempted to say, is specific 
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enough to keep the analogy working, and with it the desired conclusions.5 In 
defense of my case, I will point out that the fact that some creatures survive due 
to their particular features, those generated blindly by mutation or by genetic 
recombination, is a fortuitous result of natural selection, and not the necessary 
conclusion of some intended rational effort. At the end, what is under discussion 
here is the difference between “ascription” and “existence” of such an effort. 
To make myself clear, let me introduce another critical perspective of Dennett’s 
approach. It is an attack to the sort of account for the role of Natural Selection as 
an interpretative perspective.
It is puzzling how Dennett thinks an appeal to the Darwinian theory —which 
is, after all, a causal story about the mechanisms of speciation— could reveal an 
“element of interpretation” in content ascription. Interpretativism is, inter alia, 
the view that, strictly speaking, we don’t really have beliefs and desires. But, one 
supposes, what a creature doesn’t really have can’t help it much in its struggle for 
survival. It is for exactly this reason that, unlike Dennett, most people who take 
an evolutionary line on Intentionality are correspondingly Realist about content. 
Qua Darwinists, they suppose that there’s a matter of fact about what selection 
history a creature has and about what mechanisms served to mediate its history 
of selection. So they are required to suppose also that organisms can’t be selected 
for believing truths unless they do believe truths (Fodor and Lepore, 1993, p. 74).
Fodor and Lepore’s target is the tension between the role beliefs and desires 
as just ascribed features of the subjects and their role as results and leaders of the 
evolutionary process. On the one hand, if they are nothing but heuristic tools that 
help the interpreter to make sense of the subject’s behavior, then to treat them 
as ends promoted by evolution or anything of that sort. On the other, if there is 
anything at all that beliefs and desires has been selected for by nature, then it is 
nonsense to talk about them as simply hermeneutic idioms. I could not agree 
more with the authors of this criticism. Either a set of features exists or does not 
exist, even if it is possible, as certainly it is, to refer to and make use of ontologically 
nonexistent objects. But the fact that one can use such expressions does not allow 
us to conclude their existence, and of course not to introduce their existence as 
an explanation or as a conclusion of any empirical argument.
There is also a second tension Fodor and Lepore indicate in Dennett’s intentional 
attribution program. In this new case the target is the use of the intentional stance 
as interpretative mean to understand evolutionary processes. The tension now 
is between two different roles assigned to evolution: the role of justifier of the 
attribution of intentional states to ourselves, and its role of subject over which the 
intentional strategy can be applied. For the first one, Dennett has stated that without 
and appeal to what “Mother Nature has in mind” no attribution of intentional 
5 I am in debt to Professor Pat Manfredi for pointing out this subject to me.
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states to us can be sustained. For the second, any attribution of intentional states 
to Mother Nature rests on the assumption of optimal design we use to make sense 
of evolution. Then, Fodor and Lepore state, “apparently, the hermeneutic status 
of intentional ascriptions (to us) derives from the correspondingly hermeneutics 
status of ascriptions of biological functions (to mental states), which in turn derives 
from the hermeneutics status of intentional ascriptions (to Mother Nature).” The 
circularity of such an approach is just obvious. As in the prior case, I agree with 
this view of Dennett’s attempt and, in fact, I find in it supportive for my argument 
against the proposed analogy between evolution (Mother Nature) and Dawkins’ 
robots. The only way out of the problem of combining existent and non-existent 
features in the landscape is to recur to a circular definition of the way natural 
selection shapes species by appealing to its postulated final goals. The ascription of 
such final goals, as seen, has been introduced as an element of the interpretative 
system, making the intended conclusion of nature operating “as if” aiming some 
specific goal the result of the application of a circular argument.
 As a result of the discussion up to this point, it can be said that, even if 
Dennett arguments have not been shown to be unsound, at least there are several 
open questions that Dennett’s appealing to natural selection still has to solve.
4. Ideal rationality under fire
A second problem I will deal with is the situation which Stich has called 
the argument from the inevitable rationality of the believers. From Dennett’s 
perspective, states Stich,
When we attribute beliefs, desires and other states of commonsense 
psychology to a person- or for that matter to an animal or an artifact- we 
are assuming or presupposing that the person or object can be treated as 
an intentional system. An intentional system is one which is rational through 
and through; its beliefs are “those is ought to have, given its perceptual 
capacities, its epistemic needs, and its biography… [Its desires] are those it 
ought to have, given its biological needs and the most practicable means of 
satisfying them… [And its] behavior will consist of those acts that it would 
be rational for an agent with those beliefs to perform.” The point is not that 
people must be rational. No such conclusion follows from Dennett’s view. 
What does follow from Dennett’s view is that people must be rational if they 
can usefully be viewed as having any beliefs at all. We have no guarantee 
that people will behave in a way that makes it profitable for us to assume the 
intentional stance toward them. But intentional descriptions and rationality 
come in the same package; there is no getting one without the other… If a 
system infers irrationally, it cannot be an intentional system; thus we cannot 
ascribe beliefs and desires to it. But since inference is a belief generating 
process, the system does not infer at all (1984, pp. 254-255).
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What Stich shows here is that, from Dennett’s perspective, the possibility for a 
subject’s behavior to be understood from the intentional instance is a situation of all 
or nothing for the ascription of rationality to the subject. If no rationality is ascribed, 
then the intentional stance approach will be useless. But worse than that, if there 
is no chance for using profitably the intentional stance in a particular subject, the 
subject has to be considered as a non-inferential system at all. According to Stich, 
the problem with the model is the Dennett has mistaken the relation between our 
ordinary notions of belief and desire and his notion of an idealized fully rational 
intentional system. It happens not to be the case that the ordinary ascription 
of beliefs and desires presuppose fully rationality. In fact, Stich argues, “there is 
nothing in the least incoherent or unstable about a description, cast in intentional 
terms, of a person who has inconsistent beliefs” (255). Then, what is mandatory 
for the ascription of intentional attitudes to a subject from the intentional stance 
seems not to be necessary at all in any ordinary situation, making Dennett’s system 
unnecessarily restrictive.
Dennett’s defense to this attack is to clarify the scope and limits of the intentional 
stance interpretative approach. Once such a task is completed, there would be 
no place for problems of the sort presented by Stich. Dennett holds that nobody 
is always perfectly rational, invulnerable to fatigue or lack of memory, or to any 
sort of malfunction or design imperfection. Any of those situations would lead to 
circumstances where the interpretation and anticipation of behaviors by intentional 
attribution would be impossible, “in much the same way the physical damage to an 
artifact, telephone or automobile, may render it indescribable by the normal design 
terminology for that artifact” (1979, p. 28). Then, behavioral abnormalities cannot 
be considered challenges for the intentional ascription strategy, since they are, by 
definition, out of the scope of the strategy. In addition, states Dennett, 
It is at least not obvious that there are systematically irrational behavior or 
thinking. The cases that have been proposed are all controversial, which 
is just what my view predicts: no such thing as a cut-and-dried or obvious 
case of “familiar irrationality.” This is not to say [again] that we are always 
rational, but that when we are not, the cases defy description in ordinary 
terms of belief and desire (1981, p. 87).
In such a case, no interpretation can be settled on. As a general result, once 
realized that the intentional attribution strategy applies only under the assumption 
of agent’s rationality, the problem of misinterpreting or lack of interpretation in 
situation of irrationality is not a problem the intentional strategy has to solve. This 
is so both because such situations fall beyond its scope and because it has not 
been proved that something like systematic irrationality exists.
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But there is no easy way out from the problem of attribution of rationality. 
In fact, Fodor has developed a direct attack on Dennett’s use of the attribution 
of ideal rationality. Defending his own agenda, the existence of propositional 
(intentional) attitudes as real mental entities and not just as simple interpretative 
categories, Fodor has pointed some inconsistencies in Dennett’s model. 
Dennett’s analysis [of intentional attribution] explains the utility of the 
intentional idiom without assuming that there are facts that intentional 
ascriptions correspond to. If the analysis is right, then the least hypothesis 
is, surely, that there are no such facts and that appears to be the conclusion 
Dennett wants us to endorse. What, then, can be said in favor of the analysis? 
Dennett’s main argument goes something like this: Since intentional stance 
predictions will work only insofar as we are dealing with rational systems, 
an assumption of rationality is implicit in every such prediction. But such 
assumptions are ours to make or to withhold: i.e., they are themselves 
heuristic idealizations, justifiable only insofar as they lead, by and large, 
to true intentional stance predictions. So, we can conclude the unfacticity 
of propositional attitude ascriptions from the unfacticity of the rationality 
assumptions that they presuppose (Fodor, 1981, p. 115). 
What Dennett would have to do for his argument to be sound, states Fodor, 
is to be able to prove two related things. First, that in any attempt to predict the 
behavior of an entity from its intentional states, some assumption of rationality is 
implicit; second, that the character of such assumptions is nothing else but simply 
heuristic. Neither of them, holds Fodor, are accomplished by Dennett; and in each 
case the cause of the failure is possible to be traced. For the first one, Fodor states, 
Dennett’s intentional system does not rest on an assumption of rationality, but on 
a counterfactual assumption of rationality. Instead of stating that because of its 
necessary rationality it is possible to predict subject’s behavior, Dennett’s defense 
of the intentional attribution program relies on the notion that such a behavior 
would not be possibly described unless irrationality were discarded from subject’s 
behavior. As it has been shown, the introduction of the argument from natural 
selection is meant to hold Dennett’s case. For the second of the uncompleted 
tasks, Fodor shows that the required notion of ideal rationality would only be 
necessary if realism about propositional attitudes is shown to be wrong. Otherwise, 
the mental representations of an organism, the mental processes that model its 
logic would offer a more accurate account of the subject’s intentional behavior. 
But, Fodor insists, Dennett has continuously failed in showing the flaws of realism 
about propositional attitudes6. Then, Dennett has not fulfilled the requirements 
for its system to be solid, and the conclusions it holds would simply not follow. 
This short essay is not the place to discuss Fodor’s procedures and results. For the 
present theme it will be sufficient to show Dennett’s defense, and to see how it is 
intended to articulate with the central body of his interpretative system.
6 See the results presented  infra, 9.
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Against these new charges Dennett’s answer resembles the prior ones. He 
will show the limits and suitable extent of the proposed notion of ideal rationality, 
and use the results to justify his personal conclusions. As said, this is just like what 
was done for the defense of intentional attribution as a valid interpretative system. 
The first step towards the wanted clarification is Dennett’s own recognition of the 
tension present in his theory. Even playing the assumption of rationality a crucial 
role in the intentional attribution program, he recognizes having systematically 
resisting any declaration on the nature of rationality itself. The main reason for 
doing so is that the intentional attribution program rests on a concept of rationality 
is systematically pre-theoretical. Rationality, Dennett says, cannot be identified 
with deductive closure: being rational is not believing all the logical consequences 
of every belief one have. Such a claim would be in open contradiction with the 
natural limits of real-time responses the brain is forced to produce. It would be 
impossible, infinitely time consuming, for a brain to compute, hold and remember 
all the information such a definition would require. Nor is rationality, continues 
Dennett, perfect logical consistency: the inexistence of any contradictory beliefs 
would not be possible, or even thinkable, to avoid given the mechanical efficiency 
of our brains, and our lack of permanent and perfect memory, attention, and 
knowledge. Finally,
I am careful not to define rationality in terms of what evolution has given 
us- so I avoid outright tautology. Nevertheless, the relation I claim holds 
between rationality and evolution is […] that if an organism is the product 
of natural selection we can assume that most of its beliefs will be true, and 
most of its beliefs-forming strategies rational (Fodor,1981, p. 97).  
What then does it mean that rationality is considered as a “pre-theoretical 
concept”? It means that whatever rationality is, it is necessarily a concept based on 
our “shared intuitions about what makes sense.” What else, asks Dennett, could 
one rely on? (98) As an intuitive and non-formal concept, rationality is nothing 
more than a “general purpose term of cognitive approval,” and this in turn, implies 
the revisable and conditional character of the belief-forming strategies and their 
resulting outcomes. Then, instead of a strait definition of rationality, or of rationally 
formed beliefs, Dennett’s morals is that all we can do when judging the rational 
status of any agent’s beliefs and desires is to make comparative estimations 
between them and our own beliefs, desires, and so. At the end, the “idealized” 
character of rationality is given by the unavoidable choice of using ourselves as 
standards.
But Dennett’s answer begs the question about the notion of rationality; he 
says nothing that allows a characterization of the attributed rationality. As a matter 
of fact, according to Dennett any attempt for defining rationality has to be done 
appealing to what we consider it is, to our “shared intuitions”. The problem arises 
when one notice that most of our shared intuitions lead us to the conclusion 
241Intentional attribution and rationality: A critical reading 
of dennett's intentional attribution program 
Revista Filosofía UIS, Vol. 15, No. 1, enero-junio de 2016 pp. 225-243
that rationality is defined in terms of logical consistency or deductive closure, 
precisely the terms Dennett is compelling us to avoid. However, those are some 
of the strongest intuitive notions of what to be rational would mean. When one 
is asked to be “as rational as possible” one is being required to be as consistent 
as one can be. Of course this is not the answer Dennett what us to give, but he 
has not offer us any alternative solution to such a request, and the requisite to 
use our intuitions lead us far from where Dennett wants us to be. It seems that 
Dennett is confusing the common sense and the theoretically necessary notions 
of rationality and makes use of each one of them when he need to, while treating 
them as incompatible when circumstances dictate. Additionally, when trying to 
escape from the temptation of “defining rationality in evolutionary terms,” Dennett 
falls into the problem of treating as real something he defends to exist only as a 
pragmatic tool. As Stich has pointed out, Dennett’s argument
Slips almost unnoticeably from the claim that natural selection favors 
cognitive processes which yield true beliefs in the natural environment 
to the claim that natural selection favors rational belief-forming strategies. 
There are many circumstances in which inferential strategies which from a 
normative standpoint are patently invalid will nonetheless generally yield 
the right answer (1980, p. 53).   
With his cryptic definition of rationality, Dennett cannot contend this sort of 
criticism, as it is impossible to resolve the puzzle Fodor and Lepore have unveiled.
5. Interpreting belief from the intentional stance.
Finally, there is another problem that threatens Dennett’s approach to 
rationality and that his presentation does not resolve; the inevitable rationality of 
belief interpreters. In his attack on Quine’s program for Natural Epistemology, J. 
Kim has introduced the problem of the notion of belief as normative on its own. 
Kim states that, given the non-normative character of natural epistemology, it is 
impossible to think about it as of being about beliefs. According to Kim:
In order to study the sensory input-output relations for [a] given cognizer, we 
must find what “representations” he has formed as a result of the particular 
stimulations that have been applied to his sensory transducers. Setting 
aside the jargon, what we need to be able to do is to attribute beliefs, and 
other contentful intentional states, to the cognizer. But belief attribution 
ultimately requires a “radical interpretation” of the cognizer, of his speech 
and his intentional states; that is, we must construct an “interpretative 
theory” that simultaneously assigns meanings to his utterances and attributes 
to him beliefs and other propositional attitudes. […] Unless our cognizer 
is a “rational being”, a being whose cognitive output is regulated and 
constrained by norms of rationality —typically, these norms holistically 
constrain his propositional attitudes in virtue of its contents— we cannot 
intelligibly interpret his “output” as consisting of beliefs. Conversely, if we 
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are unable to interpret our subject’s meanings and propositional attitudes 
in a way that satisfies a minimal standard of rationality, there is little reason 
to regard him as a “cognizer”, a being that forms representations and 
construct theories. That means that there is a sense of “rational” in which 
the expression “rational beliefs” is redundant; every belief must be rational 
in certain minimal ways. […] Unless the output of our cognizer is subject to 
evaluation in accordance with norms of rationality, that output cannot be 
considered as consisting of beliefs (1988, p. 394). 
Kim’s account seems to be made to explain Dennett’s methods and goals, and 
that is what justifies the long quote of his presentation. The central point of the 
presentation is the recognition of the necessity for the interpreter of behaviors, 
the cognizer, to be rational in order to be able to assign rationality to the agent 
whose behavior he is trying to make sense of. This is precisely Dennett’s aim when 
stating the “idealized” character of his notion of rationality: no one can attribute 
rationality unless he himself is rational.
Rationality in its broad and fundamental sense is not an optional property 
of beliefs, a virtue that some belief may enjoy and other lack; it is a 
precondition of the attribution and individuation of belief- that is, a property 
without which the concept of belief would be unintelligible and pointless 
(pp. 395-396). 
What Kim is showing corresponds with what I want to point out as underlying 
Dennett’s use of rationality attribution. The necessity of a notion of rationality 
possessed by the interpreter prior to undertaking his work introduces some doubts 
about the possibilities for finding in the observed subject something different from 
what we are using as an interpretative device. We do not just see what we say we 
see; what we see in the subject’s behavior is precisely what we have introduced 
in the subject’s mind in order to make sense of its behavior. When interpreting 
behaviors, it seems we are just seeing ourselves mirrored in the subject under 
scrutiny. Then what we find there is not surprisingly close to what we have, 
actually, it is just the image of our own mental content. If what we find and what 
we introduce are inescapably the same, then their equation is trivial and there 
is nothing to said to be found. On the other hand, if what is found is defined in 
terms of what is introduced, one needs to have a clear cut between them in order 
to avoid self-reference and infinite regress. Again, with the definition of rationality 
Dennett has provided us with such a difference is less than easy to be made.
Like in the case of the argument from natural selection, it has been shown 
that there are some open questions for Dennett’s intentional attribution program 
in respect to its notion of ideal rationality and its attribution. Summed up, the 
questions presented here would not prove Dennett’s approach to be fully misled 
or inconsistent; but this is not their purpose. Their main aim of the paper is to 
point out some aspects of the intentional attribution program that, if defensible, 
would require further developmentf
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